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Abstract 
The role that stock markets should be afforded in economic development policy 
in China is the subject of debate. Some argue that they are essential to 
reforming state-owned enterprises (SOE’s) and overcoming deficiencies in 
China’s credit markets. However, others claim they are not necessary 
institutions for achieving high levels of economic development and are more 
likely to be destabilizing. This paper seeks to shed light on the impact 
that stock markets have had on China’s economic development to date. 
Available data suggests that listing SOE’s has been important in terms of 
raising funds for their reform. However, the corporate governance impact 
has been ineffectual and stock markets were also an insignificant source 
of funding for non-state owned firms. Finally, on a macro-level, their impact 
on the overall level of savings mobilization and the allocative efficiency 
of capital has been negligible. The policy conclusions are that, firstly, 
the state should begin trading the shares that it controls, and secondly, 
non-state owned firms should also be allowed to list. 
 
 
 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the formation of national exchanges in 1991, China’s stock markets have 
developed rapidly. When placed in an international comparative perspective, Laurenceson 
(2001, p.63) shows that, at least when measured in terms of market capitalization, stock 
market development in China appears advanced relative to the overall level of economic 
development. The rising importance of stock markets over the past decade has largely been 
the result of the central government promoting them as a means of facilitating the reform of 
state-owned enterprises (SOE’s). However, despite their rapid growth and promotion, the role 
that stock markets should be assigned in China’s economic development policy is the subject 
of continuing debate amongst economists.  
 
On one hand, some development economists view stock markets as an 
‘indispensable’ means of reforming China’s large SOE’s (Xiang, 1998). According to this 
view, transforming SOE's into shareholding companies can provide them with the necessary 
funds to reform and modernize, reduce their dependence upon debt finance and improve 
corporate governance. Also on a positive note, it is often argued that stock markets are a 
means of overcoming the negative effects of government financial repression in China's 
credit markets (Li, 1994, p.3). For example, if a privately owned firm could not gain access to 
credit from the dominant state banking system, then an equity issue could represent a viable 
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alternative funding source.  
 
There is, however, a competing position, which argues that China’s economic 
development would best be served by focusing on the reform of existing credit markets. In 
support of such a view, the successful, bank-based development experiences of countries such 
as Germany and Japan are frequently cited. On this basis it is contended that stock markets 
are not necessary institutions for achieving high levels of economic development (Singh, 
1990; He, 1994). Some authors take an even more extreme position and argue that stock 
markets are in fact likely to harm economic development due to their susceptibility to market 
failure, which is often manifest in the volatile nature of stock markets found in many 
developing countries (Singh, 1997; Singh and Weiss, 1998). 
 
In light of these conflicting views, and the key role that financial reform policy 
occupies in the transition to a market economy, the time is ripe for an assessment of the 
contribution that stock markets have made to China’s economic development to date. Section 
2 of this paper reviews key theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature dealing 
with the link between stock markets and economic development. Section 3 then uses 
available data to make an assessment of their impact in China. Section 4 summarizes the 
findings and draws policy conclusions.  
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2.  STOCK MARKETS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: 
LITERATURE SURVEY 
 
The theoretical and empirical literature concerning stock markets and economic 
development is vast and this section does not attempt to cover it in its entirety. Like financial 
institutions, the channels through which stock markets influence economic development are 
(a) the savings rate, (b) the quantity of investment and (c) the quality of investment (Singh, 
1997, p.774). On a microeconomic level, such channels can be discussed in terms of the 
impact on corporate finance and corporate governance. However, it is also important to 
consider on a macroeconomic level whether the overall level of savings has been affected. 
Otherwise, for example, it could be that the introduction and promotion of stock markets 
simply causes a substitution by savers towards holding shares instead of bank deposits, while 
the overall level of investment funds remains constant. This, of course, is not to say that such 
a substitution could not impact on economic development, such as in the case where financial 
institutions or stock markets mobilize and allocate funds relatively more efficiently than the 
other.  
 
Traditionally, an important debate in the literature has been whether a stock 
market-based financial system or a bank-based system impacts upon channels a) – c) more 
effectively. The corporate governance role of financial institutions and markets in particular is 
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often discussed in terms of two distinct models (Mayer, 1994, p.189). The first model is 
labeled the outsider, stock market-based approach (OS) and is associated most notably with 
the US and the UK. Under the OS model, firm ownership is typically diffuse and individual 
shareholders are outsiders in the sense that they only have arms length input into the firm's 
decision-making through a board of directors. Corporate governance in this model is 
performed primarily through a market for corporate control. Therefore, the stock market 
plays a central role in corporate governance via the takeover mechanism. The second model 
is labeled the insider, bank-based model (IB) and is most typically associated with Germany 
and Japan. In the IB model, firm ownership is concentrated in the hands of a few key 
shareholders that rarely trade their shares. Corporate governance is exercised from within the 
firm by these insiders rather than through a market for corporate control. Banks, rather than 
stock markets, feature predominantly in this model. Their influence is through several 
channels, including being important suppliers of external finance, holders of firm equity and 
holding seats on the firm's management board (Corbett, 1994, p.316). With respect to 
transitional economies, there is considerable debate as to whether such economies are best 
served by the OS or IB model (Popov, 1999, p.1). On one hand, the IB model seems the most 
natural choice because banks are already established and have a history of lending to firms 
(Aoki, 1995). Stock markets only exist in embryonic form in many transitional economies 
and hence cannot be expected to play a significant role in corporate financing and governance, 
at least in the short and medium term. Scholtens (2000, p.535) also argues that stock markets 
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require a much more elaborate legal system and prudential framework than banks to function 
effectively. On the other hand, it could be argued that there is little scope for the development 
of bank-led corporate governance because the state banks that dominate the financial sector 
in transitional economies are not skilled in making decisions according to commercial 
principles (Rowstowsi, 1995).  
 
Empirical studies examining the impact of stock markets on economic development 
have produced some important insights. Earlier studies based on international panel data 
returned differing results. For example, Atje & Jovanovic (1993), using a data set of 39 
countries over the period 1980 – 1988, found that a strong, positive and statistically 
significant relationship existed between stock markets and economic growth. However, this 
result was later criticized by Harris (1997) on the basis of the methodology employed. Using 
an expanded data set and an alterative model specification, Harris (1997) concluded that the 
evidence suggesting that stock markets promote economic development was “at best very 
weak”. More recent studies by Levine & Zervos (1998) and Khan & Senhadji (2000) have 
been particularly informative due to the utilization of nested models and more detailed model 
specifications that consider separately the channels through which financial institutions and 
markets impact upon economic development. The findings of these studies suggest that a) 
stock markets and financial institutions are not necessarily competing in nature, but rather are 
complimentary with both potentially positively impacting on economic development, and b) 
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the stock market has its greatest impact on economic development through its creation of 
liquidity. This finding acts as confirmation for earlier theories that postulated that the 
liquidity provided by stock markets raises the productivity of capital on an economy-wide 
level because it facilitates longer-term, profitable investment (Demirguc & Levine, 1996, 
p.229).  
 
Another important contribution of recent empirical studies has been to show that the 
impact stock markets have on economic development appears to display considerable 
diversity between individual countries. For example, evidence presented by Arestis & 
Demetriades (1997, p.785-790) concluded that the relationship between stock markets and 
economic development in the US was largely positive but insignificant in the case of 
Germany. Such findings should not be surprising. Okuda (1990, p.240), for example, earlier 
noted that the causal link between financial factors and economic development is crucially 
dependent upon the nature and operation of financial institutions, markets and policies 
pursued by individual countries. Therefore, while the findings of studies using international 
panel data are informative, they also need to be complimented by individual country case 
studies. Section 3 contributes to this effort by considering the case of China.  
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3. STOCK MARKETS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE 
CASE OF CHINA 
 
Data constraints seriously impinge upon an empirical investigation into the impact of 
stock markets on China’s economic development. Typically, only financial data such as stock 
prices and trading volumes are available, which goes a long way to explaining why the bulk 
of previous studies examining China’s stock markets have been from a financial economics 
perspective rather than a development economics perspective. This paper primarily makes 
use of a relatively comprehensive data set of China’s listed companies published on-line at 
www.chinaweb.com. This site is produced by ChinaWeb Ltd, in association with contributors 
such as Homeway, a leading provider of financial services in China, and the South China 
Morning Post, Hong Kong’s leading English language news provider. It makes available 
selected data on China’s listed firms, with the information being sourced from the latest 
available company annual reports (1999 or 2000).  
 
To consider the corporate financing contribution of stock markets, the ideal approach 
is to compare the relative importance of internal financing, external equity financing and 
external debt financing in explaining the growth of net corporate assets (Singh & Weiss, 1998, 
p.610). Unfortunately, data limitations prevent such an analysis from being conducted in the 
present paper. To shed light on this issue, the equity / asset ratio for each company was first 
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calculated. This datum was available for 902 listed companies.  According to SSB (CSY 
2000, p.643), the total number of listed firms on China’s stock markets in 1999 was 945. The 
mean equity / asset ratio returned was 53.1% (median = 54.2). While this result does not shed 
light on the importance of equity capital relative to other financing sources, it does 
nonetheless indicate that equity financing in an absolute sense has been a significant source 
of finance for listed companies.  
 
Considering the liability / asset ratio of listed companies is also useful in gauging the 
importance of equity financing. Liabilities of non-listed SOE’s consist almost exclusively of 
bank loans and in recent years have reached extremely high levels. Indeed, as noted in the 
introduction, one of the key objectives of listing SOE’s is to reduce their dependence upon 
debt finance. There are two simple ways that can be used to test if equity financing has 
reduced dependence upon debt financing. Firstly, looking at listed firms, one would expect to 
see a negative correlation between the equity / asset ratio and the liability / asset ratio. That is, 
those firms which have been permitted greater access to equity financing, should have been 
able to reduce their liability / asset ratio and their dependence on debt to a larger extent. 
Relevant data was available for 915 companies. The results confirm a strong negative 
correlation between these two series, with a correlation coefficient of – 0.97.  
 
Secondly, if equity financing has been significant, it could also be expected that 
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listed firms (formerly SOE’s) would have a lower liability / asset ratio than SOE’s taken as a 
whole. For reasons of data availability, this study focuses solely on comparing listed firms 
from the industrial sector with state-owned industrial firms taken as a whole. Focusing on 
industrial firms is also warranted because the bulk of China’s listed companies are from the 
industrial sector, with a minority coming from sectors such as real estate development, 
retailing, tourism, transport and finance. Aggregate data for all industrial SOE’s in 1999 is 
available from SSB, CSY 2000 (p.414-417), while data on listed companies is sourced from 
the on-line database acknowledged earlier. In order to make these data series as comparable 
as possible, two actions were first undertaken. Firstly, listed firms from non-industrial sectors 
of the economy were removed from the calculations. Deciding whether to include or exclude 
a listed firm is not always a clear cut matter given that several are conglomerates and 
undertake activities in numerous sectors of the economy. Therefore, as a rule, if industrial 
activities constituted the primary business activity of a listed firm, it was retained for the 
comparison. After this filtering process, 747 listed companies were retained. Secondly, it was 
also necessary to remove that component of industrial SOE’s assets that are used for 
non-industrial production. This is because non-listed industrial SOE’s provide a variety of 
services to workers such as schools and hospitals to name a few. However, in the process of 
listing, these assets are removed the firm’s books. The percentage of industrial SOE’s assets 
not used for industrial production has been placed at around 18% by Jefferson, Rawski and 
Zheng (1996, p.176). However, Xu and Wang (1997, p.11) state that such non-productive 
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assets typically account for between 25% - 50% of the to-be-listed firm’s total assets. A 
figure of 25% has been used for this study. After these steps have been undertaken, the data 
shows that the average liability / asset ratio of listed industrial firms was 43.96%. The figure 
for all industrial SOE’s meanwhile was 82%. Thus, this result is supportive of the above 
evidence in suggesting that external equity financing has been a significant source of funding 
for listed firms and useful in terms of reducing their liability / asset ratio.  
 
To gauge the corporate governance effects of China's stock markets, the ratio of net 
profits to assets was calculated for each listed company. This datum was available for 925 
listed companies. Unfortunately, measures directly considering economic efficiency such as 
the productivity of capital could not be calculated due to the necessary data being unavailable. 
Nevertheless, calculating profitability is still relevant because one of the stated corporate 
governance objectives in transforming SOE's into listed companies is to make them more 
responsible for their own profits and losses. The average ratio of net profits / assets was just 
3.60% (median = 4.08). In addition, 9.19% of all companies had a net profit / asset ratio of 
less than 0. To put the profitability of listed firms in a comparative perspective, the net profit / 
asset ratio of listed industrial firms can be compared with the net / profit ratio of industrial 
firms of other ownership types. The average net profit / asset ratio was 1.65% for all 
industrial SOE’s (after non-productive assets have been removed), 4.33% for collective firms, 
3.78% for shareholding companies (in China most shareholding companies are not listed on 
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public exchanges), 3.56% foreign-funded firms and 2.99% for firms funded from sources 
based in Hong Kong, Macao or Taiwan (SSB, CSY 2000, p.414-417). Thus, in this context, 
the corporate governance impact of stock market appears comparable with that achieved by 
other industrial firms featuring non-state ownership. There is, however, one factor that makes 
the comparative financial performance of listed firms alarming and raises concerns about the 
corporate governance impact of the stock market. Firms selected for listing on China’s stock 
exchanges are not drawn in a random manner. As noted by Yao (1998, p.6), it is a prerequisite 
condition for a firm to attain a stock market listing that it must have been profitable for the 
previous three years. As a result Xu and Wang (1997, p.3) make the point that it is important 
to realize that “Publicly-listed companies, however, represent only a small subset of China’s 
enterprises – a clean and perhaps better performed group of enterprises which were chosen to 
be listed on the two stock exchanges”. Thus, the fact that the data indicates that roughly 10% 
of listed companies now have a negative net profit / asset ratio, despite the short history of 
China’s stock markets, suggests some serious corporate governance problems exist.  
 
One corporate governance problem postulated by Tam (1999, p.88) is that while the 
Chinese authorities have tried to impose a legal and regulatory framework borrowed from the 
US model of corporate governance, present conditions in China’s stock markets are more 
akin to countries such as Germany and Japan. In particular, in contrast to the diffuse 
ownership of listed companies in the US, shareholding in China’s listed companies remains 
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highly concentrated. Based on the annual reports of China’s listed companies in 1995, Xu & 
Wang (1997, p.49) showed that the percentage of outstanding shares owned by the five 
largest shareholders in China’s listed companies averaged 58.1%. This compared with 25.4% 
in the US, 33.1% in Japan and 41.5% in Germany. The data set available for this paper can be 
used to update Xu & Wang’s data to see if any change in ownership concentration has 
occurred. Ownership concentration data was available for 910 listed companies. The results 
showed that the ownership share of the top five shareholders has remained practically 
unchanged over the past five years with a mean value of 58.39% (median = 59.81). The 
extremely small ownership share of minority shareholders is also clearly evidenced by the 
data. For example, expanding the calculation to the ownership concentration share of the top 
10 shareholders only slightly increases the mean value to 60.99 (median = 62.55). The 
ownership share of the single largest shareholder averaged 44.22% (median = 43.46). In 369 
companies, or 40.55% of the listed companies for which data was available, the ownership 
share of the largest shareholder was equal to or greater than 50%.  
 
However, as illustrated by the experiences of countries such as Germany and Japan, 
higher ownership concentration per se need not result in a failure of corporate governance. 
The key problem in the case of China’s stock markets is that the high ownership 
concentration actually reflects the continuing dominance of state ownership in many listed 
companies. This is a point of departure from the German and Japanese model of corporate 
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governance. For example, OECD (1995, p.17) showed that in 1993 public authorities only 
owned 1% of outstanding corporate equity in Japan and 4% in the case of Germany. 
Dominant state ownership means that the traditional incentive problems facing SOE’s have 
not changed. As long as the state continues to be the primary shareholder, the corporate 
governance impact of ‘insiders’ on the firm’s performance will be sub-optimal. Furthermore, 
because shares controlled by the state (so-called state shares and state-owned legal person 
shares) cannot be legally traded, the market for corporate control where ‘outsiders’ exercise 
governance is compromised. To estimate the degree to which this has occurred, the 
proportion of tradable shares to total outstanding shares was calculated. This datum was 
available for 913 companies. The average ratio of tradable shares to total outstanding shares 
was just 38.53 % (median = 36.70). In only 8.32% of companies, was the ratio greater than 
50%. Thus, a market for corporate control is non-existent for the overwhelming majority of 
China’s listed companies and it can be concluded that managers face only a limited threat of 
punishment for poor decision-making from either ‘insiders’ or ‘outsiders’. It should also be 
noted that the influence of the state runs ever deeper than their dominant ownership position. 
For example, Xu & Wang (1999, pp.82,83) showed that the state’s representation on the 
board of directors of many listed companies far outweighed that which could be justified 
even on the basis of their sizeable ownership stake. 
 
The impact of stock markets on macroeconomic channels to growth such as the rate 
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of savings and the overall allocative efficiency of capital are now considered. The ideal 
approach for empirically investigating the former relationship it to regress the various 
determinants of savings including stock market parameters, against the rate of savings 
(Bonser-Neal and Dewenter, 1999). Unfortunately, this would not be a meaningful approach 
in the case of China given that only annual data since 1991 is available for many relevant 
variables. However, what is useful to consider is the savings mobilization performance of 
China's stock markets compared with other domestic securities markets and financial 
institutions. Table 1 shows that despite impressive growth, the volume of funds raised by the 
stock market continues to remain well behind these other channels of savings mobilization. 
This is instructive because it means that any impact stock markets may have had on aggregate 
savings must have been very small.  
 
This conclusion also applies to the impact of stock markets on the allocative 
efficiency of capital at a macroeconomic level. Bearing this in mind, the allocative efficiency 
effects of stock markets can be considered in more depth by evaluating the informational 
efficiency and fundamental valuation efficiency of the stock pricing mechanism. Testing for 
the informational efficiency of stock prices revolves around examining whether stock prices 
behave in a manner implied by the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). The EMH contends 
that if stock prices are efficient in an informational sense, they will rapidly adjust to new 
information and that current prices will fully absorb and reflect all available information  
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Table 1.  Savings Mobilized via Stock Markets, Other Domestic Securities and Financial Institutions 
 
Year Stock Markets Other Domestic Securities Financial Institutions 
1991 5.0  4066.4 
1992 94.1  5389.0 
1993 233.0  6159.0 
1994 365.1 2075.3 10845.5 
1995 56.03 1727.0 13209.7 
1996 271.6 3172.3 14889.0 
1997 735.8 4098.5 13819.1 
1998 468.6 5757.6 13307.6 
Notes: 
1. The unit for all data is RMB 100 million. 
2. The data for stock markets refers to the capital raised through A and B share issues on China's 
stock markets. The data for other domestic securities refers to the total value of issued securities such 
as government bonds, corporate bonds, etc. The data for financial institutions refers to the amount of 
new deposits in China's financial institutions. It is calculated as the change in outstanding year-end 
balances.  
3. A blank space signifies that data was unavailable. 
Sources: 
1. SSB, CSY, various years. 
2. ACFB 1997, EE, p. 161. 
3. CMS, various issues. 
 
(Mookerjee & Yu, 1999). Empirical testing of the EMH involves testing whether current 
stock prices and returns can be predicted on the basis of past values. If stock prices are 
efficient then these variables should display a random walk process. Otherwise, the stock 
pricing mechanism can be considered inefficient because investors can theoretically achieve 
profits simply by utilizing available information such as past prices. Numerous recently 
conducted empirical studies on the behavior of stock prices in China have concluded that they 
do not follow a random walk process (Song, et al., 1998; Su & Fleisher, 1998; Mookerjee & 
 18 
Yu, 1999). Testing whether stock prices accurately reflect the economic fundamentals 
underlying a firm is conceptually more difficult. However, the degree of stock price volatility 
can serve as a useful guide. For example, if stock prices are driven by speculative motives 
and herding behavior, then they will be highly volatile and represent inefficient signals for 
capital flows in the economy (Singh, 1997, p.774). For much of their short history, the stock 
markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen have been highly volatile and numerous instances of price 
bubbles can be easily cited. For example, in one instance, Shanghai's composite price index 
doubled in a single day (Su & Fleisher, 1998, p.250). Xu & Wang (1999, p.95) also note that 
the speculative nature of shareholding in China amongst individual investors is apparent by 
the fact that the average period for which they held shares was just 1-2 months. This 
compared with 18 months in the US. Many researchers and observers, including the People’s 
Bank of China, have expressed the view that stock prices are excessively volatile in the sense 
that they often reflect speculative activities rather than the economic fundamentals of listed 
firms (PBC, CFO 1994, p.54; Spencer, 1995, p.29; Mookerjee & Yu, 1999). The fact that 
shares controlled by the state cannot be traded worsens the degree of share price volatility in 
China. When only a small proportion of a company's total shares are available for trading, 
share prices cannot reflect the market's view of the fundamental value of a listed firm 
(Spencer, 1995, p.30; Yao, 1998, p.22). However, it should be noted that this volatility does 
appear to have declined in the most recent years. For example, Laurenceson (2001, p.62) 
shows that the standard deviation in the Shanghai composite share price index (based on 
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monthly observations) fell from a high of 42.69 in 1994 to 6.32 in 1998.  
 
4. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
Taken as a whole, the findings of the previous section indicate that the impact of the 
stock market on China’s economic development has been limited. In particular, the data 
highlighted serious concerns over the corporate governance impact of the stock market on 
reforming SOE’s. This is an important finding because it implies that the continual usage and 
promotion of the stock market almost solely for the purpose of SOE reform is a deficient 
policy choice, at least as long as the commitment to majority state ownership of listed 
companies is maintained. It also implies that the central government will have to look to 
alternative corporate governance strategies in their bid to improve the performance of SOE's 
and promote their reform.  
 
The one area where the stock market did appear to be quite successful in helping to 
reform SOE's was in the raising of funds for their modernization and restructuring. However, 
the importance of the stock market as a channel for raising funds for investment should not 
exaggerated. Firstly, on a microeconomic level, because nearly all listed firms are ex-SOE’s, 
the stock market has been an insignificant source of external financing for non-state owned 
firms. Gregory & Tenev (2001) state that in 1999 only 1% of listed firms were non-state 
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firms. Secondly, on a macroeconomic level, the total amount of funds raised on stock markets 
has been insignificant relative to the aggregate amount of savings in China.  
 
Finally, the evidence also suggested that the stock market has not yet significantly 
improved the efficiency with which capital is allocated in the economy. In large part this was 
due to the fact that stock markets only allocate a small percentage of total savings in China. 
Evidence from previous studies was also presented which pointed to the fact that the 
efficiency of the stock pricing mechanism as a signal for capital flows has often been lacking. 
Also, given that the impact of the stock market on the corporate governance of listed 
companies was dubious, the most efficient firms were not necessarily utilizing the funds 
raised. 
 
 Nevertheless, the above findings should not be interpreted as meaning that the stock 
market cannot play a useful role in China's economic development in the future. Rather, they 
simply suggest that there have been deficiencies in the way it has been used to date. Two 
strategies in particular would seem to offer considerable promise. These strategies are in 
addition to the need to improve the prudential framework, which is a problem common to 
stock markets in nearly all developing countries. Firstly, in order to better utilize the stock 
market as a means of improving corporate governance in reforming SOE's, the state could 
begin converting and trading the shares that it controls. This is not a new policy proposal 
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(Tam, 1999, p.98). Indeed, Ma (1995, p.169) notes that the state has experimented with such 
activities since 1993. However, the data used in this paper shows that little real progress has 
been made. Secondly, the stock markets could also be opened up to non-state owned 
enterprises. Given the success of the stock market in raising funds for SOE's, it can be 
envisaged that it could become an important means through which China's non-state sector 
could access funds for investment in the future. This would be particularly valuable because 
it is the non-state firms that at present are largely excluded from accessing the dominant state 
banking system. Allowing more firms to list would also then place the stock market in a more 
prominent position to influence the level of aggregate savings in China. Another advantage of 
listing non-state firms on the stock market is that because there is no ideological conflict over 
ownership rights, all shares could be freely floating, which would have the effect of 
introducing a market for corporate control and reduce share price volatility. Thus, in this 
context, the stock market could well improve the allocative efficiency with which capital is 
allocated in China.  
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